Archive for the ‘Strategy’ Category

Renewable Energy’s Gloomy Outlook

Friday, April 8th, 2011




At the Clean Energy Ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi, the International Energy Agency yesterday released its first Clean Energy Progress Report. While the report grasps at some notable success stories – “at least ten countries now have sizeable domestic markets, up from just three in 2000,” the authors wrote – the general outlook is actually rather gloomy.

Almost half of new electricity demand over the last decade has been generated from coal, meaning that “achieving the goal of halving global energy-related CO2 emissions by 2050 will require a doubling of all renewable generation use by 2020 from today’s level.”
And how does the IEA suggest that renewable generation be doubled in the next nine years? Through increased investment in renewable technology – most importantly, so-called “clean coal.”

“Extensive deployment of carbon capture and storage is critical to achieve climate change goals,” the report claims, calling for around 100 large-scale CCS projects by 2020, and over 3,000 by 2050. There are five large-scale CCS in operation today – none of which are commercial deployments.

I’m sorry, but building 10 CCS plants a year over the next nine years is a fantasy. In 2009 I produced a report for Pike Research on CCS that punctured the notion that commercial coal plants will be retrofitted with carbon-capture systems in the near-term.

“The addition of CCS systems to power plants will likely add between 50% and 70% to the cost of producing electricity,” I calculated. The challenges include uncertainty about the costs of the technology, the lack of a pipeline network to transport CO2 to geological storage sites, and most notably the absence of a price on carbon emissions. “The intensive short-term financing, radical policy shifts, and R&D advances that would be required for multiple deployments of CCS in the next five years appear unlikely,” I concluded.

A look at the chart accompanying the IEA report tells you all you need to know about the flawed priorities behind the Agency’s projections. Under the scenario contemplated here, by 2050 expanded nuclear power will account for 6% of the carbon-emissions reductions required to reach the “Blue Map” goal for total worldwide CO2 emissions; CCS will provide 19% of the desired reductions. If you reverse those totals you’d have a much more realistic, and achievable, set of goals.

Meanwhile overall venture funding for clean energy is up: “Venture capitalists invested $2.57 billion in the clean technology sector in the first quarter,” Reuters reports, citing figures from Cleantech Group LLC, “up 31 percent from a year earlier, with most of the money going to companies involved in solar power.” That’s the most since 2008, before the financial crisis shoved the world economy into a ditch. None of that went into advanced nuclear power, although Khosla Ventures, one of Silicon Valley’s most admired and imitated venture funds, is a backer of TerraPower, which is developing traveling-wave reactors.

President Obama, having watched his energy policy go down in flames at the start of his administration, is readying a revamped and scaled-down plan to move away from fossil fuels. But the radical new budget proposal from Republican Rep. Paul Ryan, the chairman of the House budget committee, would essentially abandon all government support for renewable energy while preserving federal subsidies for fossil fuels.

The plan “rolls back expensive handouts for uncompetitive sources of energy, calling instead for a free and open marketplace for energy development, innovation and exploration,” Ryan wrote in an op-ed the week in The Wall Street Journal. Translation: forget about solar tax credits and government-support loans for wind-energy projects, and don’t touch subsidies to Big Oil.

So what is to be done? The plan outlined by Kirk on this blog is a great place to start. I would add that the steps in the plan – particularly No. 2, “Restart LFTR Research & Development” – should be thoroughly costed-out. In his July 2010 post on Energy From Thorium entitled “Energy Cheaper Than From Coal,” Robert Hargraves makes some initial calculations. A realistic, fully developed cost model for developing liquid-fluoride thorium reactors is the first step in demonstrating that advanced nuclear power is the only way out of our current dilemma. And that organizations promoting clean coal, and ill-founded goals for carbon capture and sequestration like those found in the new IEA report, are “talking moonshine,” to quote Lord Rutherford.

And, by the way: Abu Dhabi, the scene of today’s ministerial meeting, last month “broke ground on the proposed site of its $20 billion first nuclear plant, part of the emirate’s plan to diversify its energy mix and free-up more fossil fuels for lucrative export.” To where do you think they’re planning to export that excess oil?

A Review of Presidential Energy Policy

Wednesday, March 30th, 2011

A new presidential speech on energy policy means it’s time again to trot out this historic overview of the subject:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c
An Energy-Independent Future
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes Political Humor Tea Party


Did you notice that there was a particular energy source that they consistently failed to mention?

Sorensen Rebuttal of IEER/PSR Thorium Paper

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011

Several people who have recently learned about thorium have contacted me with regards to a “fact sheet” about thorium issued by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) and
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) called “Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power.” The authors of this sheet were Arjun Makhijani and Michele Boyd.

Last year, Dr. Alexander Cannara wrote a letter to IEER/PSR pointing out errors and omissions in the “fact sheet” and requesting IEER/PSR to implement corrections. To the best of my knowledge no amendment or correction was ever issued.

I have taken it upon myself to write a more extended rebuttal to the claims made about thorium by Makhijani and Boyd and submit it to the online community for your consideration. The entirety of their original statement is included in the rebuttal and denoted by italics.

Thorium “fuel” has been proposed as an alternative to uranium fuel in nuclear reactors. There are not “thorium reactors,” but rather proposals to use thorium as a “fuel” in different types of reactors, including existing light-water reactors and various fast breeder reactor designs.

It would seem that Mr. Makhijani and Ms. Boyd are unaware of the work done at Oak Ridge National Laboratory under Dr. Alvin Weinberg from 1955 to 1974 on the subject of fluid-fueled reactors, particularly those that used liquid-fluoride salts as a medium in which to sustain nuclear reactions. The liquid-fluoride reactor was the most promising of these fluid-fueled designs, and indeed it did have the capability to use thorium as fuel. It was not a light-water reactor, nor was it a fast-breeder reactor. It has a thermal (slowed-down) neutron spectrum which made it easier to control and vastly improved the amount of fissile fuel it needed to start. It operated at atmospheric pressure rather than the high pressure of water-cooled reactors. It was also singularly suited to the use of thorium due to the nature of its chemistry and the chemistry of thorium and uranium.

Thorium, which refers to thorium-232, is a radioactive metal that is about three times more abundant than uranium in the natural environment. Large known deposits are in Australia, India, and Norway. Some of the largest reserves are found in Idaho in the U.S. The primary U.S. company advocating for thorium fuel is Thorium Power (www.thoriumpower.com). Contrary to the claims made or implied by thorium proponents, however, thorium doesn’t solve the proliferation, waste, safety, or cost problems of nuclear power, and it still faces major technical hurdles for commercialization.

Mr. Makhijani and Ms. Boyd may wish to update their document since “Thorium Power” is now called “Lightbridge” and no longer advocates for the use of thorium, whereas the community of supporters of liquid-fluoride thorium reactors (LFTR) still maintains strong support for the use of thorium because it is indeed a solution to the issues of proliferation, waste, safety, and cost that accompany the present use of solid-fueled, water-cooled reactors.

Thorium is not actually a “fuel” because it is not fissile and therefore cannot be used to start or sustain a nuclear chain reaction. A fissile material, such as uranium-235 (U-235) or plutonium-239 (which is made in reactors from uranium-238), is required to kick-start the reaction. The enriched uranium fuel or plutonium fuel also maintains the chain reaction until enough of the thorium target material has been converted into fissile uranium-233 (U-233) to take over much or most of the job. An advantage of thorium is that it absorbs slow neutrons relatively efficiently (compared to uranium-238) to produce fissile uranium-233.

On the contrary, thorium is very much a fuel because in the steady-state operation of a LFTR, it is the only thing that is consumed to make energy. Makhijani and Boyd are correct that any nuclear reactor needs fissile material to start the chain reaction, and the LFTR is no different, but the important point is that once started on fissile material, LFTR can run indefinitely on only thorium as a feed—it will not continue to consume fissile material. That is very much the characteristic of a true fuel. “Burning thorium” in this manner is possible because the LFTR uses the neutrons from the fissioning of uranium-233 to convert thorium into uranium-233 at the same rate at which it is consumed. The “inventory” of uranium-233 remains stable over the life of the reactor when production and consumption are balanced. Today’s reactors use solid-uranium oxide fuel that is covalently-bonded and sustains radiation damage during its time in the reactor. The fluoride fuel used in LFTR is ionically-bonded and impervious to radiation damage no matter what the exposure duration. LFTR can be used to consume uranium-235 or plutonium-239 recovered from nuclear weapons and “convert” it, for all intents and purposes, to uranium-233 that will enable the production of energy from thorium indefinitely. Truly this is a reactor design that can “beat swords into plowshares” in a safe and economically attractive way.

The use of enriched uranium or plutonium in thorium fuel has proliferation implications. Although U-235 is found in nature, it is only 0.7 percent of natural uranium, so the proportion of U-235 must be industrially increased to make “enriched uranium” for use in reactors. Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are nuclear weapons materials.

Since so many nuclear weapons have already been built and are being decommissioned, one might assume that Makhijani and Boyd would welcome a technology like LFTR that could safely consume these sensitive materials in an economically-advantageous way, beating swords into plowshares and using material that was once fashioned as a weapon as a material that can provide light and energy to billions. Enriched uranium or plutonium can’t simply be “thrown away”. LFTR puts these materials to productive use as they are destroyed in the reactor and uranium-233 is generated.

In addition, U-233 is as effective as plutonium-239 for making nuclear bombs. In most proposed thorium fuel cycles, reprocessing is required to separate out the U-233 for use in fresh fuel. This means that, like uranium fuel with reprocessing, bomb-making material is separated out, making it vulnerable to theft or diversion. Some proposed thorium fuel cycles even require 20% enriched uranium in order to get the chain reaction started in existing reactors using thorium fuel. It takes 90% enrichment to make weapons-usable uranium, but very little additional work is needed to move from 20% enrichment to 90% enrichment. Most of the separative work is needed to go from natural uranium, which has 0.7% uranium-235 to 20% U-235.

In a fluoride reactor, all of the fuel processing equipment will be located in a containment region containing the reactor and its primary heat exchangers, under very high radiation fields, and under the high heat needed to keep the fuel liquid. Once the system is properly designed to direct uranium-233 created in the outer regions of the reactor (the “blanket”) to the central regions of the reactor (the “core”) there will be no possibility of redirection of the material flow. Such a redirection would necessitate a rebuild of the entire reactor and would be vastly beyond the capabilities of the operators. Furthermore, the nature of U-233 removal and transfer from blanket to core involves the operation of an electrolytic cell that will allow very precise control and accountability of the material in question. Unlike solid-fueled reactors the uranium-233 never needs to leave the secure area of the containment building or come in contact with humans in order to continue the operation of the reactor. This is another important point that the authors have failed to distinguish as they have ignored the existence or implications of fluid-fueled thorium reactors.

To claim that uranium-233 is just as effective as plutonium-239 for nuclear weapons is gross simplification bordering on outright deception. They have similar values for critical mass, but this leaves out a very important point. The nuclear reactions that consume uranium-233 also produce small amounts of uranium-232, a contaminant that will later be mentioned by the authors but ignored at this stage of the criticism. U-232 has a decay sequence that includes the hard gamma-ray-emitting radioisotopes bismuth-212 and thallium-208. Indeed, the half-life of U-232 is short enough that this decay chain begins to set up within days of the purification of the uranium, and within a few months that gamma-ray flux from the material is intense. These gamma rays destroy the electronics of a nuclear weapon, compromise the chemical explosives, and clearly signal to detection systems where the fissile material is located. This is one of the key reasons why no operational nuclear weapons have ever been built using uranium-233 as the fissile material.

It has been claimed that thorium fuel cycles with reprocessing would be much less of a proliferation risk because the thorium can be mixed with uranium-238. In this case, fissile uranium-233 is also mixed with non-fissile uranium-238. The claim is that if the uranium-238 content is high enough, the mixture cannot be used to make bombs without a complex uranium enrichment plant. This is misleading. More uranium-238 does dilute the uranium-233, but it also results in the production of more plutonium-239 as the reactor operates. So the proliferation problem remains either bomb-usable uranium-233 or bomb-usable plutonium is created and can be separated out by reprocessing.

In my opinion, mixing uranium-238 with uranium-233 during the normal operation of a LFTR is a bad idea because it compromises the capability of the reactor to “burn” thorium to a degree that it then becomes necessary to add fissile material to keep the reactor running. This is because uranium-238 will absorb many of the neutrons that would otherwise convert thorium into uranium-233, instead converting uranium-238 into plutonium-239. Plutonium-239 is a poor fuel in a LFTR due to the limited solubility of plutonium trifluoride (PuF3) and the poor performance of plutonium in a thermal-neutron spectrum (only 2/3 of the plutonium-239 will fission when struck by a neutron).

But something is possible in the fluid fuel of a LFTR that is impossible in the solid fuel of a conventional reactor with regards to the “downblending” of uranium. Under extreme scenarios, it may be desireable to have a separate supply of uranium-238 inside the reactor containment that could be irreversibly mixed with the uranium-233 in the core. This would have the effect of making the reactor unable to restart, and despite the contention of Makhajani and Boyd, there is no feasible way to isotopically separate uranium-233 (contaminated with uranium-232) from uranium-238 because of the severe gamma radiation that would be emitted during any attempt to separate the isotopes. This approach to “just-in-time” downblending is only possible with fluid fuel, and its absence of consideration in the document again shows that the authors are unaware of the fluid fuel option and its implications.

Further, while an enrichment plant is needed to separate U-233 from U-238, it would take less separative work to do so than enriching natural uranium. This is because U-233 is five atomic weight units lighter than U-238, compared to only three for U-235. It is true that such enrichment would not be a straightforward matter because the U-233 is contaminated with U-232, which is highly radioactive and has very radioactive radionuclides in its decay chain. The radiation-dose-related problems associated with separating U-233 from U-238 and then handling the U-233 would be considerable and more complex than enriching natural uranium for the purpose of bomb making. But in principle, the separation can be done, especially if worker safety is not a primary concern; the resulting U-233 can be used to make bombs. There is just no way to avoid proliferation problems associated with thorium fuel cycles that involve reprocessing. Thorium fuel cycles without reprocessing would offer the same temptation to reprocess as today’s once-through uranium fuel cycles.

Makhijani and Boyd really betray a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of uranium isotope separation facilities with their simplistic and cursory description of U-233 separation from U-238. Such a process would be so difficult due to the presence of U-232 that it simply would not be considered, even by the hypothetical “suicide” operators that they postulate. Anyone who had invested the large sums of money into a uranium isotope separation system would never risk permanently crippling its ability to operate by introducing U-232-contaminated feed into the system.

Proponents claim that thorium fuel significantly reduces the volume, weight and long-term radiotoxicity of spent fuel. Using thorium in a nuclear reactor creates radioactive waste that proponents claim would only have to be isolated from the environment for 500 years, as opposed to the irradiated uranium-only fuel that remains dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. This claim is wrong. The fission of thorium creates long-lived fission products like technetium-99 (half-life over 200,000 years). While the mix of fission products is somewhat different than with uranium fuel, the same range of fission products is created. With or without reprocessing, these fission products have to be disposed of in a geologic repository.

Again, the authors make blanket statements about “thorium” but then confine their examination to some variant of solid thorium fuel in a conventional reactor. In a LFTR, thorium can be consumed with exceptionally high efficiency, approaching completeness. Unburned thorium and valuable uranium-233 is simply recycled to the next generation of fluoride reactor when a reactor is decommissioned. The fuel is not damaged by radiation. Thus thorium and uranium-233 would not enter a waste stream during the use of a LFTR.

All fission produces a similar set of fission products, each with roughly half the mass of the original fissile material. Most have very short half-lives, and are highly radioactive and highly dangerous. A very few have very long half-lives, very little radioactivity, and little concern. A simple but underappreciated truth is that the longer the half-life of a material, the less radioactive and the less dangerous it is. Technetium-99 (Tc-99) has a half-life of 100,000 years and indeed is a product of the fission of uranium-233, just as it is a product of the fission of uranium-235 or plutonium-239. Its immediate precursor, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), has a half-life of six hours and so is approximately 150 million times more radioactive than Tc-99.

Nevertheless, it might come as a surprise to the casual reader that hundreds of thousands of people intentionally ingest Tc-99m every year as part of medical imaging procedures because it produces gamma rays that allow radiography technicians to image internal regions of the body and diagnose concerns. The use of Tc-99m thus allows physicians to forego thousands of exploratory and invasive surgeries that would otherwise risk patient health. The Tc-99m decays over the period of a few days to Tc-99, with its 100,000 half-life, extremely low levels of radiation, and low risk.

What is the ultimate fate of the Tc-99? It is excreted from the body through urination and ends up in the municipal water supply. If the medical community and radiological professionals intentionally cause patients to ingest a form of technetium that is 150 million times more radioactive than Tc-99, with the intent that its gamma rays be emitted within the body, and then sees no risk from the excretion of Tc-99 into our water supply, where is the concern? It is yet another example of fear, uncertainty, and doubt that Makhijani and Boyd would raise this issue as if it represented some sort of condemnation of the use of thorium for nuclear power.

If the spent fuel is not reprocessed, thorium-232 is very-long lived (half-life:14 billion years) and its decay products will build up over time in the spent fuel. This will make the spent fuel quite radiotoxic, in addition to all the fission products in it. It should also be noted that inhalation of a unit of radioactivity of thorium-232 or thorium-228 (which is also present as a decay product of thorium-232) produces a far higher dose, especially to certain organs, than the inhalation of uranium containing the same amount of radioactivity. For instance, the bone surface dose from breathing an amount (mass) of insoluble thorium is about 200 times that of breathing the same mass of uranium.

Statements like this really cause me to wonder if Makhijani and Boyd understand the nature of radioactivity. Yes, thorium-232 has a 14-billion-year half-life, which means that the radioactivity of thorium is exceptionally low. It will rise as the decay chain of Th-232 begins to form, but it is still at a very low level. To be concerned with the radioactivity of thorium in spent fuel, while neglecting to mention the five billion kilograms of thorium contained in each meter of the Earth’s continental crust again appears to be another example of fear, uncertainty, and doubt levied unfairly against the use of thorium. The buildup of thorium-228 as part of the decay of thorium will happen on a scale within the Earth’s crust so titanically in excess of any activity on the part of man so as to render that point utterly immaterial to any discussion of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

Since both thorium and uranium are natural and common constituents of the Earth’s crust, discussing a bone surface dose obtained by breathing insoluble thorium—a very strange exposure pathway—and contrasting it with uranium is again utterly immaterial to the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel. Do Makhijani and Boyd mean to say that it would be preferable to be breathing uranium instead? The criticism seems to have no structure.

Furthermore, LFTR will not reject thorium to a waste stream nor generate “spent fuel” in the conventional sense. Thorium remains in the reactor until consumed for energy. At shutdown, unconsumed thorium is transferred to the next generation of reactor.

Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long-term hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non-radioactive metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

Thorium is found with rare-earth mineral deposits, and global demand for rare-earth mining will inevitably bring up thorium deposits. At the present time, we in the US have the strange policy of considering this natural material as a “radioactive waste” that must be disposed at considerable cost. Other countries like China have taken a longer view on the issue and simply stockpile the thorium that they recover during rare-earth mining for future use in thorium reactors. In addition, the United States has an already-mined supply of 3200 metric tonnes of thorium in Nevada that will meet energy needs for many decades. The issues surrounding thorium mining are immaterial to its discussion as a nuclear energy source because thorium will be mined under any circumstance, but if we use it as a nuclear fuel we can save time and effort by avoiding the expense of trying to throw it away.

Research and development of thorium fuel has been undertaken in Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the UK and the U.S. for more than half a century. Besides remote fuel fabrication and issues at the front end of the fuel cycle, thorium-U-233 breeder reactors produce fuel (“breed”) much more slowly than uranium-plutonium-239 breeders. This leads to technical complications. India is sometimes cited as the country that has successfully developed thorium fuel. In fact, India has been trying to develop a thorium breeder fuel cycle for decades but has not yet done so commercially.

Thorium/U233 reactors like LFTR produce sufficient U-233 to make up for U-233 consumed in the fission process. This may be what the authors meant by “breeding more slowly”, but since they consider plutonium a dangerous substance and eschew the use of nuclear power, it is a wonder why they would consider a reactor that does not produce plutonium as having some sort of deficiency. They neglect to elaborate on what sort of “technical complications” this very attractive feature would entail.

The thorium effort in India has been centered around the use of thorium in solid-oxide form, and has suffered from the deficiencies of using this approach, which are transcended through the use of thorium in liquid fluoride form. This is further evidence that the authors are unaware of the implications of the liquid-fluoride thorium reactor.

One reason reprocessing thorium fuel cycles haven’t been successful is that uranium-232 (U 232) is created along with uranium-233. U-232, which has a half-life of about 70 years, is extremely radioactive and is therefore very dangerous in small quantities: a single small particle in a lung would exceed legal radiation standards for the general public. U-232 also has highly radioactive decay products. Therefore, fabricating fuel with U-233 is very expensive and difficult.

Previously I mentioned the implications of the presence of uranium-232 contamination within uranium-233 and its anti-proliferative nature with regards to nuclear weapons. U-232 contamination also makes fabrication of solid thorium-oxide fuel containing uranium-233-oxide very difficult. In the liquid-fluoride reactor, fuel fabrication is unnecessary and this difficulty is completely averted.

Thorium may be abundant and possess certain technical advantages, but it does not mean that it is economical. Compared to uranium, thorium fuel cycle is likely to be even more costly. In a once-through mode, it will need both uranium enrichment (or plutonium separation) and thorium target rod production. In a breeder configuration, it will need reprocessing, which is costly. In addition, as noted, inhalation of thorium-232 produces a higher dose than the same amount of uranium-238 (either by radioactivity or by weight). Reprocessed thorium creates even more risks due to the highly radioactive U-232 created in the reactor. This makes worker protection more difficult and expensive for a given level of annual dose.

The liquid-fluoride thorium reactor has an exceptionally simple and self-contained fuel cycle that has every promise of being less-expensive than today’s wasteful and complicated “once-through” approach to uranium fuel utilization. Makhijani and Boyd try to assign thorium to the wasteful “once-through” fuel cycle, point out deficiencies, and then condemn thorium as having no promise. This might analogous to putting diesel fuel in a gasoline-powered car and then pointing out how deficient diesel fuel is when the car will no longer operate. It is disingenuous and deceptive, and the kindest thing that can be said is that Makhijani and Boyd are ignorant of the implications of the liquid-fluoride thorium reactor and its fuel cycle, which they should not be if they presume to issue a “position paper” such as this.

Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long-term hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non-radioactive metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

This is a repeat of the issue previously considered, as is immaterial as a factor for or against the use of thorium in nuclear powered reactors since thorium will be mined anyway during the mining of rare-earth minerals. The only question will be whether the mined thorium will be wasted or not.

In conclusion, Makhijani and Boyd fail to consider the implications of the liquid-fluoride thorium reactor on all aspects relating to the benefits of thorium as a nuclear fuel. They fail to consider its strong benefits with regards to nuclear proliferation, since no operational nuclear weapon has ever been fabricated from thorium or uranium-233. They fail to consider how LFTR can be used to productively consume nuclear weapons material made excess by the end of the Cold War. They fail to consider the reduction in nuclear waste that would accompany the use of LFTR. They fail entirely to account for the safety features inherent in a LFTR—how low-pressure operation and a chemically-stable fuel form allow the reactor to have a passive safety response to severe accidents. They fail to account for the improvement in cost that would be realized if LFTRs were to efficiently use thorium, reduce the need for mining fossil fuels, and increase the availability of energy.

Mr. Makhijani and Ms. Boyd should retract this statement in its entirety as flawed and deceptive to a public that needs clear and accurate information about our energy future.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard tells the Financial World about Thorium

Sunday, March 20th, 2011

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium

Welcome Telegraph readers!

1962 AEC Report to Kennedy on Nuclear Power

Sunday, March 20th, 2011

In trying to answer the persistent question about LFTRs: “why wasn’t this done before?” I’ve obtained a report from 1962 made to President Kennedy where future development options for nuclear power were laid before him. Alvin Weinberg specifically references this report in his 1994 memoir (“First Nuclear Era”) and goes on to say that it recommends both the plutonium fast-breeder reactor and the liquid-fluoride thorium reactor as technologies that should be developed. Here’s what Weinberg had to say in his book:

“Until then I had never quite appreciated the full significance of the breeder. But now I became obsessed with the idea that humankind’s whole future depended on the breeder. For society generally to achieve and maintain a living standard of today’s developed countries depends on the availability of a relatively cheap, inexhaustible source of energy. (As I write these words, I realize that until recently I tended to dismiss solar energy as too expensive, and fusion as probably infeasible. I really don’t know whether this will always be the case.)

“The breeder became central in my thinking about nuclear-energy development. And, with Glenn Seaborg’s becoming the chair of AEC in 1960, the breeder acquired ever-increasing status with AEC—especially recognition as an essentially inexhaustible source of energy.

“In 1962, the AEC issued a report to the president on civilian nuclear power. Lee Haworth, a superbly responsible physicist-administrator, was in charge of drafting the report. He projected a nuclear deployment by 2000 of about 700 gigawatts (compared with the actual deployment in 1993 of 102 gigawatts), which seemed at the time quite reasonable. Both the fast breeder based on the 239Pu-238U cycle and the thermal breeder based on the 233U-232Th cycle figured prominently in the report. Indeed, the report implied that both systems should be pursued seriously, including large-scale reactor experimentation. It particularly favored molten uranium salts for the thermal breeder. But the molten-salt system was never given a real chance. Although the AEC established an office labeled “Fast Breeder,” no corresponding office labeled “Thermal Breeder” was established. As a result, the center of gravity of breeder development moved strongly to the fast breeder; the thermal breeder, as represented by the molten-salt project, was left to dwindle and eventually to die.”

At any rate, I have obtained a copy of this report and scanned it and made it available as a PDF. I think it is worthy of our study in an attempt to figure out why decisions were made that led us to the current situation.

Civilian Nuclear Power…a Report to the President–1962 (7 MB PDF)

Here are some interesting passages from the report:

Page 39:

In the thorium-uranium-233 cycle, the situation is quite different. U-233 emits more neutrons in thermal fission than does U-235; on the other hand, it is only slightly better in fast fission than in slow. Hence, thermal breeders offer greatest promise, minimizing as they do the power density and fuel endurability requirements. However, thermal breeders have a different complication in that fission products act as strong absorbers of slow neutrons, requiring that these products not accumulate too much. Among the most promising solutions of this difficulty is to use the fuel in fluid form, thus permitting continuous extraction and reprocessing to remove the fission products. Various fluid fuels have been studied for this purpose. The currently most promising approach is the use of fused uranium salts which can be circulated, both for reprocessing purposes and for heat transport. This technology is, however, in a fairly early stage.

Even when breeder reactors become economic and begin to be installed there will be a complication regarding fuel supplies. At least for some time to come, economic breeders will have breeding gains so low that they will produce not more than 3% or 4% of their fuel inventory each year. Hence, since the annual growth in energy consumption is about 6%, it will be necessary, if nuclear power increases its fractional share of the total load, to fuel some portion of the installations with fissionable uranium-235.

This leads to no great problem in the thorium-uranium thermal breeders. The fuel demand can be fulfilled simply by charging some of them, initially at least, with U-235, though at some sacrifice in economics and in the amount of U-233 that they produce.

On the other hand the “fast” reactors required to breed an excess of plutonium are economically attractive only when plutonium rather than U-235 is used to fuel them. Hence the most promising arrangement for incorporating them in a rapidly expanding nuclear power economy would undoubtedly be to use thermal converters to help provide the plutonium needed for added installations. This combination would continue until increases in the relative “yield” of plutonium from the breeders, together with a lower relative rate of growth of electrical energy consumption enabled the breeders to catch up and produce enough plutonium by themselves.

We get somewhat of an insight into the thinking of the Atomic Energy Commission with regards to breeder reactors. If they were to use uranium-plutonium, then plutonium supplies were crucial due to the fact that each fast breeder needed 10 to 15 times as much fissile material to generate a unit of power as a thermal reactor did. The light-water reactors at the time were producing plutonium as a byproduct. The fast-breeder needed and wanted that plutonium. Reactors like LFTR needed a tiny fraction of the fissile inventory as the fast breeder did and could be started on HEU.

Here’s an image of how the AEC envisioned light-water reactors running on enriched uranium and producing plutonium, and fast-breeder reactors needing that plutonium, working together.

The picture begins to become clearer, especially when we consider how Weinberg described what the AEC did with this report, establishing a “Fast Breeder” office but no “Thermal Breeder” office.

More thoughts on this later…

Why we need a Small Rugged Reactor…

Friday, February 25th, 2011

This is why:

Militants in Pakistan attacked a fuel supply convoy yesterday, killing at least four, that was bound for US military facilities inside Afghanistan. Twelve tankers were set ablaze and crews struggled throughout the night to put out the fire.

What does this have to do with thorium or LFTR?

A small rugged LFTR could provide electrical energy to these bases in Afghanistan that currently rely on shipments of vulnerable petroleum. Furthermore, the high-temperature capabilities of LFTR mean that we could also synthesize hydrocarbons to fuel vehicles on site, rather than trucking them in.

How would it work?

A small LFTR unit would be brought in to a military site in the form of a few standard containers. One would hold the reactor, its fuel and blanket processing system, and the primary heat exchangers, all within a strong and sealed containment system. The fact that LFTR operates at low pressure would mean that this containment would be close-fitting to the reactor. This is very different than the containments required on today’s water-cooled reactors, where they have to accommodate the expansion of high-pressure water into steam that can happen if pressure is lost. In a LFTR, the system is at low pressure and there is no high-pressure water or other gases inside the containment. The only thing that goes in is coolant salt and the only thing that comes out is coolant salt.

This whole assembly would be lowered into a below-ground concrete bunker. The gas turbine power conversion system would be brought in and attached to the coolant salt system. Coolant salt would heat gas that would drive turbines and generate power. The gas used in the power conversion system would be air-cooled via large air intakes and outlets.

How could we generate hydrocarbons? Using the electricity from the LFTR, we crack water electrolytically to generate hydrogen and oxygen. The hydrogen is reacted with carbon (either brought in to the site or extracted from CO2 in the air) to form synthetic hydrocarbons to power vehicles and aircraft.

The fuel for the LFTR would be brought in separately from the reactor, and when it was time to leave it would be removed from the reactor first. The reactor would not be transported with fuel or blanket material onboard.

Why consider LFTR versus other designs?

LFTRs can operate at low pressures. Pressurized-water reactors can’t and gas-cooled designs like the pebble-bed reactor can’t. Low-pressure operation means you can have a compact unit with a close-fitting containment and no risk of high-pressure explosions.

Liquid-metal-cooled designs like sodium-fast reactors can also operate at low pressures, but they have reactive coolants that would be much too risky in a combat zone. You need a reactor that can take a lot of punishment and not risk a sodium fire or an supercriticality accident.

LFTRs can operate at high temperatures. This is important for generating power efficiently, but it’s even more important for making gas turbine power conversion (Brayton-cycle) and air-cooling feasible. With lower temperature reactors like water-cooled and sodium-cooled reactors, you have to use steam turbine power conversion (Rankine-cycle) and it’s really hard (not impossible, but really hard) to air-cool these systems without excessive penalty.

LFTRs are easy to fuel and keep running. Nobody wants to try to swap fuel rods or reprocess solid fuel elements in a remote environment. The liquid fuel used in LFTR can be shipped separately from the reactor. Don’t try that with a solid-fueled reactor. LFTR’s liquid-fuel is already in the right form for simple processing techniques like fluorination/reduction. Thorium in the blanket/shield of the LFTR absorbs neutron and gamma radiation while making new fuel to keep the reactor running.

LFTRs are stable and self-controlling. You don’t want a whole bunch of reactor operators trying to keep your reactor happy in a remote environment. You want a reactor that runs itself. LFTR can do that, through a strong negative temperature coefficient that makes it follow the load well, and the simple removal of xenon gas that would otherwise make changes in power level difficult. It’s the same reason why they wanted liquid-fluoride reactors for aircraft sixty years ago–they’re good at controlling themselves.

LFTRs can be protected against enemies. Liquid fuel means that “just-in-time” denaturing of the uranium-233 fuel is possible. If it looks like the bad guys are going to overrun your base, you hit a button and dump depleted uranium tetrafluoride in the core. Now no one will ever start your reactor again, and the U-233 is thoroughly denatured against any other use. (It’s always sad to trash U-233, but if the bad guys are coming, don’t you want to have the option?) Solid-fuel reactors can’t do just-in-time denaturing. You’ve got what you’ve got in the fuel and you can’t change it out in the field.

I spent two years as a civilian working at the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and had the privilege of working with men and women in uniform who had been over to the “sandbox”. I have talked with senior officials who have seen the problem firsthand that we face with vulnerable fuel convoys. I have talked to a general who wrote the letters to mothers and fathers telling them that their son or daughter had been killed transporting fuel through a combat zone. He had a simple question for me: would this reactor make a difference?

Yes sir, it would. It would make a big difference.

Doing Our Part to Reduce the Deficit

Monday, February 14th, 2011

The United States is facing a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion this year, and the new Republican-led House of Representatives (where spending originates in the US government) is looking for ways to save money.

We in the thorium community have a significant idea for how the government can

  1. save $500 million dollars
  2. accelerate the development of LFTR
  3. help NASA explore deep space
  4. save thousands of lives from cancer

It’s pretty simple–cancel the Department of Energy’s plan to destroy the uranium-233 stored at Oak Ridge National Lab.

For over ten years, the DOE’s Environmental Management division has been implementing a plan from the Defense Facility Nuclear Safety Board (97-1).

According to the DOE-EM 2011 budget request (page 14):

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory maintains the Department’s inventory of Uranium-233 (U-233), which is currently stored in Building 3019. The FY 2011 funding request will continue design of a project that processes the U-233 material in preparation for future disposal. Benefits include reducing safeguards and security requirements and eliminating long-term worker safety and criticality concerns. Recent discoveries of structural integrity issues with Building 3019 and determination that a portion of the U-233 is unsuitable for disposal at WIPP will require significant design changes to the facility. EM plans to continue the design effort through 90 percent design in FY 2011. At that point, a new baseline for construction and operations will be established. This will ensure that the construction estimate will have the accuracy necessary to complete the project on schedule and within budget.

Here’s the monetary stats on this project, according to a table on page 65 of the budget plan:

Site: Oak Ridge Reservation
PBS Field Code: OR-0011Z
PBS Name: Downblend of U-233 in Building 3019
Prior Costs FY 97-2009: $138.809M
FY10 and Remaining Cost (Low Range): $222.040M
FY10 and Remaining Cost (High Range): $246.012M
Lifecycle Cost (Low Range): $360.849M
Lifecycle Cost (High Range): $384.821M

It’s not too late to save the uranium-233. Despite spending $130 million, the effort to actually destroy the U-233 really hasn’t begun yet. Never have I rooted so hard for a government contractor to go slow and perform poorly!

From page 132:

U-233 Downblend Contract: The contract for U-233 downblending and Building 3019 shutdown was awarded to Isotek Systems, LLC in October 2003, originally managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy Congress directed the Department in the FY 2006 Energy and Water Appropriations Act to transfer the management of this project to the Office of Environmental Management and to terminate the medical isotope production. The contract has been revised accordingly. Phase I covered planning and design, which was completed in July of 2007. The current contracting schedule is for enhanced 90% design, in which a detailed cost proposal will be provided with a revised baseline and data sheet.

FY 2009: $58M
FY 2010: $38.9
FY 2011: $50M

Downblending of the U-233 hasn’t begun yet. From what I have heard, the contractor (Isotek) plans to import enough depleted uranium (DU) to create a final mixture of DU and U-233 that has the same fissile content as natural uranium (0.7% U-235). Well, if you want your final product to have only 0.7% U-233, then you’re going to need to bring in 1400 kg/0.007 = 200,000 kg of depleted uranium, and that weighs a lot. I’m guessing that that is what is requiring expensive modifications to building 3019 to support all that weight. I don’t know–one can only speculate at what is going on.

This is a very expensive project to destroy a very valuable resource. Please ask your Congressman to put an end to this waste of taxpayer money and to direct the DOE to use the U-233 for LFTRs that will produce electrical power and valuable materials for NASA’s space exploration and cancer-fighting medical isotopes.

Here is a video presentation of how saving U-233 from destruction can help NASA explore space and help save lives from cancer.

Here are the slides from that presentation.

The DOE’s own Inspector General has begged them to stop, in order to preserve the valuable medical isotopes derived from the U-233 that can help fight cancer.

Here’s their report:

Meeting Medical and Research Needs for Isotopes Derived from Uranium-233

Should the Department of Energy (Department) carry out its disposition plans to dispose of its uranium-233, there is no assurance that a viable inventory of progeny isotopes (actinium-225 and bismuth-213) will be available to meet domestic medical and scientific research needs.

China Initiates Thorium MSR Project

Sunday, January 30th, 2011

The People’s Republic of China has initiated a research and development project in thorium molten-salt reactor technology, it was announced in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) annual conference on Tuesday, January 25. An article in the Wenhui News followed on Wednesday (Google English translation). Chinese researchers also announced this development on the Energy from Thorium Discussion Forum.




Led by Dr. Jiang Mianheng, a graduate of Drexel University in electrical engineering, the thorium MSR efforts aims not only to develop the technology but to secure intellectual property rights to its implementation.



This may be one of the reasons that the Chinese have not joined the international Gen-IV effort for MSR development, since part of that involves technology exchange. Neither the US nor Russia have joined the MSR Gen-IV effort either.

A Chinese delegation led by Dr. Jiang travelled to Oak Ridge National Lab last fall to learn more about MSR technology and told lab leadership of their plans to develop a thorium-fueled MSR.

The Chinese also recognize that a thorium-fueled MSR is best run with uranium-233 fuel, which inevitably contains impurities (uranium-232 and its decay products) that preclude its use in nuclear weapons. Operating an MSR on the “pure” fuel cycle of thorium and uranium-233 means that a breakeven conversion ratio can be achieved, and after being started on uranium-233, only thorium is required for indefinite operation and power generation.




Currently there is no US effort to develop a thorium MSR. Readers of this blog and Charles Barton’s Nuclear Green blog know that there has been a grass-roots effort underway for over five years to change this. The formation of the Thorium Energy Alliance and the International Thorium Energy Organization have been attempts to convince governmental and industrial leaders to carefully consider the potential of thorium in a liquid-fluoride reactor. There have been many international participants in the TEA and IThEO conferences, but none from China.



Chinese energy demand is growing rapidly, and despite the world’s largest campaign of new nuclear construction, the vast majority of Chinese power generation still comes from fossil fuels. China has abundant supplies of coal, but their combustion has led to some of the worst air quality in the world. The ability of thorium MSRs to operate at atmospheric pressure and with simplified safety systems means that these reactors could be built in factories and mass-produced. They could then be shipped to operational sites with standard transportation. Their thorium fuel is compact and inexpensive. Chinese rare-earth miners have been rumored to have been stockpiling thorium from rare-earth mining for years, and if this is true, the Chinese will have hundreds of thousands of years of thorium already mined and available for use.

The Chinese now have the largest national effort to develop thorium molten-salt reactors. Whether other nations will follow is an open question.

Google TechTalk Video: “Save the Uranium-233″

Friday, January 28th, 2011

On January 13th I had an opportunity to talk about how we could use the uranium-233 inventory at Oak Ridge National Lab to start LFTRs and produce the plutonium-238 that we need to power space probes to explore the solar system. We can also save thousands of lives from the unique radioisotopes that we would extract from uranium-233. I hope you enjoy the presentation:

Links to the slides are available here.

Google TechTalk Slides: “Save the Uranium-233″

Friday, January 21st, 2011

Last week I had another opportunity to give a “TechTalk” at Google and I chose to spoke on how saving the uranium-233 inventory at Oak Ridge could allow us to produce power-generating radioisotopes to explore space and to extract life-saving medical radioisotopes.

The video might not be ready for a few weeks, so I wanted to go ahead and post the slides.

“Save the Uranium-233 to Save Solar System Exploration” (PPT with notes, 4.6MB)

I did things a little differently on this presentation than usual, with the slides consisting almost totally of images and a narration included in notes along with the slides. To enjoy the presentation more in the manner it was given at Google, I recorded a narration, which is a substantially larger download, but if you’d like to hear me telling the story this is probably the better one to watch/listen.

“Save the Uranium-233 to Save Solar System Exploration” (PPT with audio narration, 18.1MB)

I wasn’t terribly happy with the audio quality of the narration, so if anyone has better ideas or wants to re-record it with better equipment feel free.