The American Nuclear Society — the professional organization of nuclear engineers and scientists in the United States — published Position Statement #47 in January 2026. It is titled “Management of Surplus U.S. Nuclear Material.” It calls out uranium-233 specifically. And it says, in the clearest possible professional language, that what DOE is doing to our U-233 inventory is, at best, suboptimal, and more likely, just flat out wrong.

The ANS policy statement matters enormously, not just for the technical record, but for the political effort to stop this destruction before it is complete.

The ANS on the MSRE

For years, DOE has justified its destruction of U-233 by claiming the material “proved to be an unviable fuel source.” That language appears in DOE press releases, in Isotek’s public statements, and in the response the Biden administration sent to Congress in 2021. It is the foundational claim on which the entire destruction program rests.

The American Nuclear Society, in its January 2026 position statement, says something directly contradictory:

“U-233 was successfully used in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) before the entire Molten Salt Breeder Reactor program was canceled in the early 1970s during budget reduction and consolidation efforts. The high potential of the technology was acknowledged by decision-makers of that era in later memoirs.”

Carefully consider that statement. The professional society of nuclear engineers says the MSRE was successful, that the program was cancelled for budget reasons, and that its potential was acknowledged even by the officials who cancelled it. This is not a fringe position. This is the considered judgment of professionals who helped craft this position.

DOE says “unviable.” ANS says “successfully used.” These cannot both be true. And when DOE’s claim conflicts with the American Nuclear Society’s position statement, I know which one we should believe.

The ANS on What DOE Is Doing

The ANS describes the current destruction program in language that should make anyone at DOE uncomfortable:

“Because no modern program was ever created to pursue use of the material, the DOE is now downblending the country’s U-233 inventory to create a waste material that will be transported to the Nevada National Security Site.”

“To create a waste material.” That is the American Nuclear Society’s characterization of what Isotek is doing in Building 2026. Not “to safely dispose of a hazard.” Not “to complete a critical cleanup mission,” but to create a waste material from something that didn’t have to be waste.

The ANS on What U-233 Is Worth

The position statement is specific about what we are throwing away:

“MSBRs have a specific fissile inventory of approximately 1 MT/GWe, which is needed at startup only and is then continuously replaced by new U-233 bred on-site from thorium. The ORNL inventory could be used to start prototype micro- or space reactors.”

The ORNL U-233 inventory — the inventory Isotek is destroying right now, canister by canister — “could be used to start prototype micro- or space reactors.” The ANS is describing a concrete, near-term application for material that is being converted into cement and shipped to Nevada.

On the medical isotope dimension, the ANS is equally direct: “Actinium-225 and bismuth-213 are highly effective in targeted alpha therapies, and their commercial use is limited only by the limited supply.” The supply is limited because DOE is destroying the source. The ANS sees the connection but the DOE does not want to.

The ANS on the Executive Orders

The position statement explicitly ties the U-233 situation to President Trump’s May 2025 executive orders:

“Reorienting fissile material management policy toward beneficial use would be consistent with the letter and spirit of EO 14302 and another 2025 EO, ‘Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security.'”

This is the American Nuclear Society telling the Department of Energy that its current U-233 policy is inconsistent with the President’s executive orders. That is a remarkable statement from a professional society that does not typically wade into political fights.

The Five ANS Recommendations

The position statement makes five specific recommendations. Every single one of them, applied to U-233, supports halting the downblending program:

1. Establish fissile material disposition policies to prioritize energy production and innovation over waste disposal. The ANS explicitly endorses the EO halt to the plutonium dilute-and-dispose program. The same logic applies to U-233 downblending.
2. Congress should enact legislation to prioritize beneficial use of fissile material over disposal. Senator Tuberville’s Thorium Energy Security Act — which has never passed — is exactly this legislation.
3. The DOE should conduct reviews involving potential industry users to identify alternatives to disposal for management of fissile materials. This is precisely what Flibe Energy requested from DOE’s General Counsel in 2019, and what DOE’s own 2011 Core Team recommended. Neither review was ever conducted.
4. Incentivize private industry to convert fissile materials into usable reactor fuels. U-233 is uniquely suited for this — it is the only fissile material that can directly fuel a thorium molten-salt reactor without further enrichment.
5. Support pilot projects to demonstrate the use and value of fissile materials in next-generation reactors. The ORNL inventory is the only source of U-233 in the world suitable for this purpose. Once it is gone, these pilot projects become impossible.

Why This Matters Politically

For years, DOE has been able to hide behind the claim that their destruction program reflects the technical consensus of the nuclear community. Congress members and their staffers, who are not nuclear engineers, have been told that the experts say U-233 is worthless and dangerous and must be destroyed. They have had no authoritative counter-voice to cite.

They now have one. The American Nuclear Society is the professional home of the engineers who design, build, and operate nuclear facilities in this country, including the ones DOE manages. When a senator’s staffer asks “but doesn’t DOE know best?” — the answer is now: “The American Nuclear Society disagrees, in a formal published position statement.”

This gives political cover to every member of Congress who has been sympathetic but reluctant to take on DOE’s technical authority. They are no longer challenging DOE’s judgment on their own. They are siding with the ANS.

It also gives Secretary Wright an authoritative external citation for halting the program. He doesn’t have to take Flibe Energy’s word for it. He doesn’t have to rely on a 2011 internal Core Team memo that was filed and forgotten. He can point to a January 2026 American Nuclear Society position statement that says, in so many words, that the current program is inconsistent with the President’s own executive orders.

What Needs to Happen Now

The ANS position statement is a significant development, but it doesn’t stop a single canister from being processed. Isotek is still destroying material. The program has been past the 40% mark since 2025 and is targeting the halfway point this year.

The window to save meaningful quantities of U-233 is closing. The easiest-to-transfer, highest-purity material has already been processed — the “Thorium Express” low-dose oxides that were the most suitable for transfer to Y-12 or Idaho National Laboratory. What remains is more challenging to handle, but it is still worth preserving.

Secretary Wright has not reviewed the 2001 Moniz memo that drives this program. He has not been asked to halt it. He has not been presented with the ANS position statement, the five EO provisions that the downblending program violates, or the specific transfer routes that have been mapped, including a barge route from ORNL to Redstone Arsenal that uses the Tennessee River with zero public road exposure.

If you want to help, the ask is simple: contact Senator Tuberville’s office and Secretary Wright’s office and tell them that the American Nuclear Society says this destruction program is wrong, that it violates the President’s own executive orders, and that a 90-day halt pending review is the minimum response the situation demands.

The ANS has given us an authoritative voice we didn’t have before. We need to use it.